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WWhen asked what he was going to do about rising rates of infl ation in the new Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini replied, “This 
revolution is not about the price of watermelons.” 
The Ayatollah may have meant what he said. But 
the practical matter of capturing and consolidating 
power after a bloody revolution is, indeed, about 
the price of watermelons – not to mention bread 
and meat – as well as about access to education, 
housing, medical care and jobs. And it is hard to 
argue with cynics who conclude that all the Iranian 
revolution has really accomplished is the replace-
ment of one parasitic elite, which owed allegiance 
to the Shah, with another, which claims legitimacy 
as the flagbearer of radical Shiite Islam. 
The data on Iran’s economy paints a gloomy 
picture. While macroeconomic performance has 
improved in the past few years thanks to the dra-
matic increase in oil prices, the long-run pattern is 
one of decline. 
At the time of the revolution in 1979, Iran had 
a GDP roughly equal to Spain’s, pumped one-
tenth of the world’s oil, and nurtured a vibrant 
middle class. Today, per capita income is one-third 
that of Spain, oil production is down by 30 per-
cent, and the middle class is being squeezed by in-
fl ation, unemployment and stagnant wages. 
Iran is facing many of the problems common to 
poor countries – most notably, a relatively young 
population made angry and restless by its grim 
economic prospects. Moreover, as in many other 
less-developed countries, dependence on natural-
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represent the bulk of both government in-
come and foreign exchange earnings in Iran, 
and thus give the offi cials and bureaucrats 
who control the petroleum industry dispro-
portionate infl uence over the economy and 
the political system.
It should not be surprising, then, that Iran 
faces a familiar (and formidable) barrier to 
growth: changes that diversifi ed and decen-
tralized the economy would weaken the rul-
ing elite, and are thus bound to be bitterly re-
sisted. Indeed, while every multilateral orga-
nization is pressing Iran to liberalize the do-
mestic economy and open it to external eco-
nomic forces, the tide appears to be moving 
in the opposite direction. Conservatives, 
whose hold on Parliament was recently 
strengthened by gains in what amounted to a 
rigged election, seem determined to extend 
state control – not to loosen it. 
measuring underachievement 
A variety of international comparisons sug-
gests just how much Iran would have to 
change to join the crowd of rapidly growing 
middle-income economies. 
Globalization. The Globalization Index, 
produced by Foreign Policy and the A.T. Kear-
ney consulting fi rm, ranks 62 countries (ac-
counting for 96 percent of world output) by a 
variety of factors. In 2005, Iran placed dead 
last, behind laggards like Nigeria, Egypt and 
Peru. 
When the results are viewed by subcate-
gory, a somewhat more textured picture 
emerges. While Iran ranks 61st in “political 
engagement” (membership and activity in 
international organizations) and 62nd in 
“personal contact” (international travel and 
communications, fi nancial remittances), it 
does somewhat better in the economic 
arena. For example, the Islamic Republic 
ranked 47th in trade openness and 48th in 
foreign direct investment. Still, it is plain 
that the Iranian economy must slog on with-
out most of the benefi ts of international 
economic integration. 
Governance. World Bank researchers re-
cently ranked 199 countries on the quality 
of governance, based on six categories: voice 
and accountability, political stability and ab-
sence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of 
corruption. By most of these criteria, Iran is 
in the bottom-quartile – and is not above av-
erage in any category. Moreover, between 
1996 and 2002 the country lost ground in 
three categories – voice and accountability, 
political stability and government effective-
ness. And it ranks in the bottom decile in reg-
ulatory quality, a critical factor in the devel-
opment of an effi cient market-based economy.
Economic Freedom. The Index of Econom-
ic Freedom, compiled by the Heritage Foun-
IRAN BY THE NUMBERS
GDP at current exchange rate (2004) $154 billion
GDP per person, purchasing power parity (2004) $7,700 
GDP growth rate (2004) 6.3 percent
Infl ation rate (2004) 16 percent
Labor force (2004) 23 million
Labor force in agriculture (2001)  30 percent
Foreign direct investment (2003) $120 million
Exports of goods & services (2003, % of GDP) 24 percent
Oil production (2004) 3.9 million barrels/day
Domestic oil consumption (2004) 1.4 million barrels/day
Oil exports (2004) 2.5 million barrels/day
Proven oil reserves 131 billion barrels
Population (2005) 68 million 
Population below poverty line (2002) 40 percent
Male literacy 86 percent
Female literacy 73 percent
Life expectancy at birth (2003) 69.4 years
Infant mortality (2004) 42 per 1,000
sources: CIA World Factbook, World Bank
ROBERT LOON EY teaches economics at the Naval 
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dation and the Wall Street Journal, scored 
Iran 148th out of 161 countries in 2005. Key 
problems include the abuse of individual 
property rights (especially when they clash 
with the interests of state-favored elites); the 
omnipresence of state-owned enterprises, 
which makes it diffi cult for private fi rms to 
compete; and the arcane rules of Islamic 
banking, which serve as a cover for noncom-
petitive lending practices. 
Access to Capital. The Milken Institute’s 
Capital Access Index weighs seven factors to 
gauge the ease with which productive enter-
prises gain access to fi nancial capital. And 
here, too, Iran ranks near the bottom. In a 
sample of 121 countries, it was in 79th place 
in 2005, behind Mongolia and Uganda. In-
sight into the causes of Iran’s low ranking can 
be found in the index’s sub-rankings. Iran did 
especially poorly in the quality of the macro-
economic environment (93rd, below the Cen-
tral African Republic and Honduras), the de-
gree of intervention in bank-based business 
fi nance (87th), the availability of alternative 
fi nancing like venture capital and credit card 
loans (104th, behind Burundi and Guinea) 
and access to international sources of fi nance 
(98th, behind Angola and Armenia).
post-revolution policymaking
There have been distinct phases in economic 
policymaking since the fall of the Shah. The 
fi rst radical phase, from 1979 to 1981, was 
It is plain that the 
Iranian economy must 
slog on without most 

















32 The Milken Institute Review
highlighted by a wave of post-revolution na-
tionalization and confi scation of property 
from individuals associated with the Shah’s 
rule. The second radical phase, from 1982 to 
1984, was marked by a shift from modern 
state socialism to strictly Islamic policies – 
notably, the imposition of interest-free bank-
ing and the dismantling of the Shah’s brand 
of central planning.
The fi rst pragmatic phase, from 1985 to 
1989, was not marked by major changes in 
economic policy, but, instead, by modest 
opening to the West as part of a broad effort 
to cope with economic and military crises. 
The precipitating factor was the huge cost of 
the war with Iraq, as measured in both lives 
and money. Low oil prices exacerbated the 
economic problem. 
The second pragmatic phase, from 1989 to 
1997 (which coincided with Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani’s presidency), was marked by the 
introduction of fi ve-year planning, some 
privatization of state enterprises, and more-
determined attempts to create ties to the 
West. Pragmatism, however, had its limits. 
The government did not back away from ef-
forts to impose Islamic rules on the domestic 
economy, and did not reduce support for fun-
damentalist Islamic movements aboard. 
The social reform phase, from 1997 to 
2004, began with the election of Mohammed 
Khatami as president in 1997. His policies, 
opposed by the conservative the Shiite legal 
establishment, emphasized due process in law 
and relaxation of controls over political dis-
cussion and social customs. Khatami sought 
an economic third way for Iran that would 
somehow combine modernization with ad-
herence to Islamic law. He also continued 
Rafsanjani’s halting efforts to open Iran to the 
world economy. These steps, proposed by the 
World Bank and IMF in the early 1990s, were 
designed to diversify output, to discipline 
markets by opening them to foreign competi-
tion, and to reduce the role of the state in the 
economy. The package included:
The harmonization of offi cial and commer-
cial exchange-rate regimes. The Bank Marka-
zi, Iran’s Central Bank, now operates a “man-
aged fl oat” currency system, buying and sell-
ing foreign exchange in the global market. 
The Bank has the discretion to allow a mod-
est depreciation of the Iranian rial in order to 
improve the competitiveness of non-oil ex-
ports – mostly petroleum-based chemicals 
and industrial goods. The medium-term goal 
was to allow the currency to fl oat on its own. 
The adoption of a foreign investment law, 
offering better protection for foreign inves-
tors and opening the entire industrial and 
services sectors to foreign direct investment. 
Most important, the law guarantees the right 
to repatriate both capital and profi ts. 
Progress in trade liberalization, refl ected in 
the reduction of non-tariff barriers (like quo-
tas) and their replacement with tariffs, along 
with an easing of regulation on non-energy 
exporters. 
Key fi nancial services fi xes, including the 
licensing of three private banks and insurance 
companies, and the recapitalization of the 
state-owned banks. Growth of private fi nan-
cial institutions should mean better access to 
credit for fl edging entrepreneurs.
Proposed fi scal changes, including a plan 
to lower and simplify corporate and personal 
income taxes and to lower rates. 
The current hard-line-conservative phase 
began in 2004 with the manipulation of Par-
liamentary elections, which created a radical 
Islamic majority and culminated in the elec-
tion of an ultra-conservative president, Mah-
moud Ahmadinejad, in the summer of 2005. 
It is not yet clear whether Ahmadinejad will 
attempt to fulfi ll his populist promises to cre-
c r o n y  c a p i t a l i s m
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ate jobs and redistribute wealth. But even if 
he were to try, it is far from clear that he could 
deliver; the disenfranchised may have voted 
for him, but he could not have been elected 
without the blessing of the clerics, military 
offi cers and commercial interests who enjoy 
the fruits of government-as-usual.
What is the prospect for the creation of in-
stitutions capable of supporting a modern dy-
namic economy? The idea of adopting the ways 
of the West plainly offends the clerics. On a 
more fundamental level, change is not a prior-
ity because the conservatives believe that as 
long as oil revenues are buoyant, the existing 
system is capable of generating enough eco-
nomic trickle-down to keep discontent at bay. 
They are probably right. The Iranian re-
form movement has, to date, waxed and 
waned in counterpoint to economic growth. 
And growth has been closely tied to oil reve-
nues. The boomlet in economic activity after 
the revolution coincided with a strong recov-
ery in oil output. Similar peaks occurred from 
1989 to 1991 and in 1996. The cycle is once 
again underway, following the rise in oil pric-
es from 2000 to now. 
diagnosis of the economic malaise
Iran apparently suffers from what was once 
called “Dutch disease” (the Dutch have a lot 
of natural gas in the North Sea) and is now 
more commonly called the “resource curse.” 
Paradoxically, natural resource wealth may 
actually harm a country’s prospects for devel-
opment – especially where it accounts for the 
bulk of government revenues, as in the case of 
rentier states ranging from Kuwait to Brunei.
The damage done by the resource curse, 
which was originally linked to the tendency 
for an abundance of resource exports to in-
crease the exchange value of the currency and 
thereby make non-resource exports uncom-
petitive in world markets, now seems broader 
and more diffi cult to correct. Large windfall 
gains associated with a rapid increase in oil 
revenues have been a particular problem be-
cause they create severe distortions in the po-
litical system as well as in the economy. In 
countries as diverse as Iran, Nigeria, Venezu-
ela and Indonesia, the “free lunch” aspect of 
Change is not a priority because the conservatives 
believe that as long as oil revenues are buoyant, the 
existing system is capa-
ble of generating enough 
economic trickle-down to 
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oil revenues leads to government ineffi ciency 
and widespread corruption, undermining ef-
forts to build the legal and social infrastruc-
ture that is needed for a market economy. 
In Iran’s case, no mark of economic failure 
stands out as much as the country’s chronic 
unemployment. Between 1996 and 2000, 
693,000 workers entered the labor market, 
while only 296,000 jobs were being created. 
Unemployment is somewhere between 15 
and 25 percent, with a disproportionate share 
among urban youth. According to the World 
Bank, the creation of jobs to stabilize unem-
ployment at an acceptable level would require 
a growth rate of roughly 6 percent. And this 
rate has only been achieved in oil boom years.
Another broad measure of the health of a 
developing country is the rate of productivity 
change. In rich countries, productivity im-
provements are driven largely by new tech-
nology. In poor ones, it is more a matter of in-
stitutional fl exibility – the capacity to move 
labor and capital from low-productivity ac-
tivities (like subsistence farming and small-
scale craft manufacturing) to high-productiv-
ity activities (like commercial agriculture and 
effi cient-scale industry). 
Almost inevitably, productivity growth 
makes some people worse off – for example, 
the local moneylender may fi nd clients taking 
advantage of better terms at a new bank. 
Hence, change is resisted by many incumbent 
interests. And the success of the resistance 
may well be strongest when entrenched elites 
have access to oil revenues to muffl e the dis-
content of the disenfranchised. It should not 
be surprising, then, that Iran’s productivity 
actually fell in the fi rst decade after the revo-
lution and has stagnated since.
The proximate cause of the stagnant pro-
ductivity in Iran is price distortion linked to 
regulation and subsidies. Subsidies on fuel, 
electricity, business loans and basic foods – 
intended to keep both the poor and their em-
ployers happy – run to tens of billions of dol-
lars annually. Total consumer subsidies were 
equivalent to 14 percent of GDP in 2001 and 
2002. And energy subsidies alone amounted 
to $16 billion.
The system encourages the waste of fuel 
that could easily be sold for foreign exchange. 
Fuel prices are about one-tenth of world pric-
es; accordingly, Iran uses a staggering 16 
times as much energy per person as India. 
Moreover, cheap fuel creates incentives to 
substitute machinery for labor – just what the 
doctor didn’t order in a country crawling 
with unskilled, unemployed youth. 
Equally important, oil revenues have, in 
effect, enabled the government to maintain 
money-losing state-owned enterprises. As 
might be expected, those enterprises have not 
been able to generate jobs. During the 1990s, 
about 70 percent of employment creation in 
Iran was in the private sector, in spite of the 
fact that state-owned enterprises dominate 
much of production. Note, too, that Iran’s 
Cheap fuel provides incentives to substitute 
machinery for labor – just what the doctor didn’t 
order in a country crawling with unskilled, 
unemployed youth. 
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state-owned enterprises are not held to inter-
national standards of accounting – and are 
thus an irresistible vehicle for corruption.
A striking peculiarity of the Iranian econ-
omy is the pervasive infl uence of non-profi t 
foundations, known as bonyads, that func-
tion as huge conglomerate enterprises. They 
enjoy a long history of social and communal 
service in the Muslim world. In some coun-
tries, bonyads are under direct control of a 
government ministry. In others, they function 
semi-autonomously, but with some degree of 
government supervision. In Iran, such checks 
are largely absent. 
The foundations’ heads are appointed by 
the supreme religious leader and report to 
him rather than to the president or to Parlia-
ment. So there is no clear system of account-
ability. Periodic attempts by Parliament to as-
sert control over them have been met by a 
stone wall. 
The mullahs have used these foundations 
to help the poor and victims of the Iran-Iraq 
war – as well as to line their own pockets. This 
policy has created an important social base of 
support for the regime, along with an endur-
ing patron-client relationship. The regime 
draws support from this large clientele group 
in times of social unrest. But the lack of ac-
countability virtually guarantees that much 
of the foundations’ assets are diverted from 
their nominal goals. 
State-owned enterprises and bonyads have 
been allowed to monopolize wide swaths of 
trade and business. The bonyads alone con-
trol 25 percent of GDP and enjoy preferential 
access to bank credit, hard currency, govern-
ment licenses and lucrative contracts, thus 
crowding out more productive private sector 
activities. 
For their part, the state-owned enterprises 
require massive subsidies from the govern-
ment to stay afl oat. Indeed, the political im-
perative to fi nance them largely explains why 
Iran has been plagued by chronic budget def-
icits. The country’s post-1980 monetary ex-
pansion (and subsequent infl ation) can be 
traced directly back to the government’s un-
willingness to oppose the credit demands of 
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The net effect of the government’s massive 
subsidies, as well as its support of highly inef-
fi cient state enterprises and bonyads, has been 
to keep the country dependent on oil and to 
attenuate the rise of a more productive pri-
vate sector needed to break out of economic 
stagnation. Oil revenues still represent 80 per-
cent of Iran’s total exports and half of govern-
ment revenues. The IMF estimates that the 
country’s fi scal balances deteriorate by about 
7 percent for every 10 percent decline in oil 
prices – a scenario that makes for a precarious 
economic future.
the future – possible alternatives
Has Iran’s Islamic revolution failed? Others 
will have to judge the religious dimensions of 
the question. What is clear, though, is that the 
regime has failed to deliver on its self-pro-
claimed goals of social justice and prosperity. 
Is there a way out of the economic morass? 
The orthodox prescription has been best laid 
out by the IMF, which has argued that the 
country has reached a point at which busi-
ness-as-usual is untenable. The balanced 
growth needed to tackle unemployment and 
poverty is simply not possible without a shift 
to free markets.
While few economists in the West would 
quibble with this assessment, Iran does not 
have the political will or institutions to carry 
out broad-based reforms. 
In fact, reforms carry 
major transition costs: in-
creased unemployment in 
the short run as the state-
owned enterprises shed 
weight or close their 
doors, as well as long-term 
pain for elites whose eco-
nomic privileges would be 
challenged. 
Other countries that 
have undertaken similar 
reform programs have 
usually done so only be-
cause they had little left to 
lose – and much to gain 
by qualifying for loans 
from the Internatioinal 
Monetary Fund and World Bank. However, 
high oil prices make it likely that Iran will be 
able to muddle along for the foreseeable fu-
ture. Equally important, the coalition of in-
terests with a stake in the status quo remains 
potent. The higher taxes needed to curb infl a-
tion and generate resources for infrastructure 
development would be costly to both incum-
bent businesses and to the bonyads. The same 
can be said for deregulation and efforts to 
curb restraints on commerce. 
Privatization of state banks and insurance 
companies is bitterly opposed by the mullahs, 
both because it would undermine the ban on 
charging interest and because it would close 
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and their business allies. Likewise, the re-
placement of ruinously expensive subsidies 
on consumer staples with a means-tested so-
cial safety net would undermine the Tamma-
ny Hall-style patronage machine that keeps 
millions of Iranians in political debt to the re-
gime. And, of course, attempts to curb cor-
ruption would meet resistance from an army 
of petty offi cials who depend on it for much 
of their income. 
The only recommendation by the IMF 
that might be acted upon – especially if oil 
revenue declines – is the privatization of the 
most capital-intensive state enterprises that 
are not major employers. By contrast, privati-
zation of the bonyads’ massive holdings would 
most likely be blocked by the religious elite, 
which effectively has veto power over virtual-
ly all legislation. 
Led by Rafsanjani, the more pragmatic 
conservatives in Iran have their own plan: du-
plicate the Chinese model in an Iranian con-
text. The idea is to offer economic growth, 
jobs and limited social freedom in exchange 
for support of the political status quo. As in 
China, direct and indirect taxes on productive 
new enterprises would keep the old guard 
well fed. These conservatives fi gure that Irani-
ans would be content with rising incomes, 
and thus willing to give up their demands for 
political pluralism. 
Is this a realistic alternative? The Chinese 
model relies on a massive infl ow of foreign 
direct investment, which brings with it both 
managerial skills and up-to-date technology. 
With U.S. sanctions fi rmly in place, an untest-
ed regulatory environment for foreign direct 
investment, and an as-yet-unchallenged tra-
dition of cronyism and corruption in busi-
ness, Iran has a long way to go before it is as 
attractive to foreign investors as, say, India, 
Poland or Mexico. 
Also overlooked by the pragmatic conser-
vatives is the fact that China bought its polit-
ical quiescence with cultural and social liber-
alization, as well as with economic growth. 
The Islamic Republic, by contrast, shows no 
signs of being willing to bribe its aspiring 
middle class with similar concessions. 
In any event, we aren’t likely to see a test of 
the Chinese model anytime soon. Rafsanjani’s 
pragmatic conservatives were solidly trounced 
by fundamentalist hard-liners in elections last 
summer. And the fundamentalists apparently 
aspire only to doing a better job of using oil 
wealth to buttress their interest-group coali-
tion. Opening the economy to potentially dis-
ruptive foreign investment (and certainly dis-
ruptive foreign competition) is not part of 
the plan. 
The saddest part here is that the gap be-
tween what Iran is and what it could be is so 
wide. Along with oil, Iran is endowed with a 
well-educated middle class. And, as is the case 
with Cuba and Palestine, expatriates would 
undoubtedly be delighted start businesses 
back home if the political climate were right. 
But for the moment, at least, Iran remains 
hostage to religious reactionaries and their 
camp followers.
Privatization is bitterly opposed by the mullahs 
because it would close off a cheap source of 
capital to the bonyads and their business allies.
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